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We analyse empirically whether cooperatives and investor-owned firms differ in terms of
productive effi ciency. Using rich Portuguese panel data covering a wide range of industries, we
apply two different empirical approaches to estimate potential differences in productive effi ciency.
The results from our benchmark random-effects model show that cooperatives are significantly
less productive, on average, than investor-owned firms, both at the aggregate level and for
most of the industries considered. However, the results derived from a System-GMM approach,
which is our preferred empirical strategy, are much less conclusive, and we cannot conclude
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1 Introduction
In this paper we document how two different forms of organizing production affect the productivity
of the firm. More specifically, we examine whether and how productive effi ciency differs between
cooperatives and investor-owned firms (henceforth IOFs). The dominant type of firm in modern
economies is the IOF, where the right to residual control is assigned to the suppliers of capital in
proportion to the capital supplied. Nevertheless, since the start of the modern cooperative move-
ment in the mid-19th century, cooperatives have continued to grow and prosper as an alternative
way of organizing production, and they have today a widespread presence is several industries and
countries.1 In many countries, the cooperative is a significant, and sometimes dominant, organiza-
tional form in several industries.2
Despite the worldwide (and in some sectors significant) presence of cooperatives, evidence on
the merits of this organizational form with respect to productive effi ciency is relatively scarce and
far from consensual. Whereas the theoretical literature on cooperatives versus IOFs is quite rich
(though also quite divergent), the empirical evidence is for the most part confined to case studies or,
at best, industry-specific analyses. Furthermore, the available evidence is found in two completely
separate and seldom cross-referenced strands of the literature; one on worker cooperatives (labour
managed firms) and another on agricultural producer cooperatives.3
In the present paper we contribute to the literature by performing a cross-industry empirical
analysis of the productivity of cooperatives relative to IOFs, using rich panel data from Portugal.
Applying two different empirical strategies, random-effect (GLS) estimation and System-GMM
estimation, we estimate different variants of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function and
test for differences in productive effi ciency between cooperatives and IOFs, based on data from 2010-
2012. We perform this analysis both at aggregate level and at industry-level, across 13 different
industries. We also perform a series of robustness checks and extensions to the main analysis. This
1According to the latest (2015) figures from Cooperatives Europe (Cocolina, 2016), there are almost 180,000
cooperatives just in Europe, an increase of 9% from 2009. These cooperatives employ more than 4.5 million people
and are present in a wide range of sectors. The largest sectors are industry and services (36%), agriculture (30%) and
housing (22%) if measured by number of firms, and agriculture (39%), retail (30%) and consumer (12%) if measured
by annual turnover.
2 In terms of market shares, figures from the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-
economy/cooperatives/index_en.htm) show that, in several countries, cooperatives are dominant in the agricultural
industry (83% in the Netherlands, 79% in Finland, 55% in Italy and 50% in France). In addition, cooperatives are
strongly present in industries such as forestry, banking, retail, pharmaceutical and health care, with cooperative
market shares in the range of 20-60% in several countries.
3See Section 2 for a theoretical discussion of cooperatives versus IOFs, and Section 3 for a review of the empirical
literature.
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includes estimating a translog production function instead of a Cobb-Douglas function.
Our results based on GLS estimations show a very clear picture, namely that cooperatives are
significantly less productive than IOFs, both at the aggregate level and for a majority of the 13
different industries considered. In 8 of these industries, we find that cooperatives would significantly
increase their output if they used the same amount of inputs but adopted the (estimated) technology
of IOFs, whereas the IOFs would produce significantly less with the same amount of inputs if they
adopted the ‘cooperative technology’. In 2 of the remaining 5 industries we find significant partial
evidence of the same, and we find no significant indications of cooperatives being more productive
than IOFs in any industry. These results are remarkably insensitive to a number of different
robustness checks, and a similar picture also emerges when we perform the same analysis on a
subsample of firms where the cooperative category is restricted to labour-managed firms.
However, the results based on System-GMM estimations, which is our preferred empirical strat-
egy, are much less conclusive. At the aggregate level, the System-GMM-results also indicate that
cooperatives are less productive than IOFs, although the productivity differentials are less precisely
estimated. Only for a particular subset of firms, namely those with less than ten workers (which we
dub ‘micro firms’), do the aggregate-level System-GMM estimates clearly suggest that cooperatives
are less productive. At industry level, the System-GMM approach yields an even less clear-cut pic-
ture. In the benchmark estimations based on Cobb-Douglas technology, we only find statistically
significant underperformance of cooperatives in two industries. In the remaining industries, we
find no statistically significant difference in productive effi ciency between the two organizational
types. At industry level, the System-GMM-results are actually considerably more in line with the
GLS results when we estimate a translog production function. In this case, we find statistically
significant (though partial) evidence of cooperatives being less productive in 6 of the 13 industries.
And again, we find no evidence of the opposite in any industry.
We also estimate productivity differentials for a sub-sample of firms in which the type of co-
operative is restricted to labour-managed firms (LMFs). The analysis in this part of the paper is
restricted to 6 industries in which the number of LMFs is suffi ciently large to perform the estima-
tions. Whereas our GLS-estimates suggest that LMFs are less productive than IOFs, the estimates
based on System-GMM show no indications of LMFs being significantly different than IOFs with
respect to productive effi ciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we place our analysis in a
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proper theoretical context by offering a precise definition of the difference between an IOF and
a cooperative and discussing the available theoretical arguments for why IOFs might be more or
less productive than cooperatives. In Section 3 we give a relatively brief review of the empirical
literature on productivity differences between the two organizational forms. The data we use are
described in Section 4, whereas in Section 5 we present our empirical strategies. Our results are
presented in Section 6. The paper is concluded by Section 7, where we summarise and discuss our
main results.
2 Theoretical context
A firm is usually owned by someone who transacts with the firm; a ‘patron’of the firm. As noted
by Hansmann (1999), this is true for both cooperatives and for IOFs. In light of this basic insight, a
cooperative can be generally defined as a firm owned by patrons other than those who supply capital
to the firm. A consumer cooperative is owned by its consumers (or a subset of them), whereas
a producer cooperative is owned by the suppliers (or a subset of the suppliers) of a particular
input to production.4 In addition, cooperatives are usually characterised by a governance structure
where both earnings and votes are distributed to members/owners in proportion to the amount of
transactions each member has with the firm.
Whereas the neoclassical theory of the profit-maximising firm is a standard model used to
describe the behaviour of IOFs, there is no such universally accepted ‘workhorse model’ of the
cooperative firm. In particular, how to define the objective of a cooperative firm is a long-standing
issue in the literature. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to develop a unified theory of coop-
eratives was made by Carson (1977), who sets up a general theory of a firm (a so-called ‘G-firm’)
that maximises a function that is monotonically increasing in the utilities of its members/owners,
and where each member may supply some of the firm’s inputs and/or consume some of its out-
puts. This implies firm behaviour that generally lies somewhere between profit-maximisation and
welfare-maximisation. The former case appears only under perfect competition in all input and
output markets. Otherwise, a consumer cooperative would charge lower output prices of its mem-
bers, and a producer cooperative would pay higher input prices to its members, compared with an
IOF (which also appears as a special case of the G-firm).
4Hansmann (1999) argues that even an IOF could be seen as a particular type of producer cooperative; a capital
(or lenders’) cooperative.
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How are the effi ciency properties of cooperatives likely to differ from those of an IOF? We can
conceptually distinguish between three types of effi ciency: (i) productive effi ciency, (ii) allocative
effi ciency, and (iii) scale effi ciency. For a given production function, models of cooperatives based
on a neoclassical framework, such at the above-described theory of the G-firm, are in principle able
to explain if and how cooperatives and IOFs differ in terms of allocative and scale effi ciency. For
example, the Carson-model predicts that, all else equal, cooperatives will operate at a (weakly)
large scale than IOFs. However, such models cannot explain if and how cooperatives differ from
IOFs with respect to productive effi ciency, which is the main question we ask in our empirical
analysis. Possible explanations for such differences are mainly based on agency and transaction
cost theories.
There are two main agency problems, with potential implications for productive effi ciency,
related to the running of a firm: (i) an agency problem between the owner(s) (principal(s)) and the
manager (agent), and (ii) an agency problem between the manager (principal) and the suppliers of
inputs, including workers (agents). An overview of the agency-based arguments in the literature
suggests that the former (latter) agency problem is larger (smaller) in cooperatives than in IOFs.
It is a well-known argument in the literature on labour-managed firms, which is a particular type
of producer cooperative, that the cooperative form of firm organisation yields a gain in productive
effi ciency because of reduced agency and monitoring costs in the relationship between managers
and workers (which, in the case of labour-managed firms, are also owners). Employee participation
is thought to stimulate incentives for workers to exert more effort, to invest more in firm-specific
human capital, and to monitor each other (see, e.g., Estrin and Jones, 1992, and Fakhfakh et
al., 2012). Similar arguments have also been put forward for other types of producer cooperatives,
where the firm is owned by the suppliers of other inputs than labour. Because of a better alignment
of interest between the firm and its suppliers, information rents —and thus procurement costs —
are lower for a cooperative than for an IOF.5 Gains in productive effi ciency due to informational
advantages have also been claimed for consumer cooperatives. The argument is that consumer-
members would be more willing to truthfully reveal information to their cooperative —for example
about the types of products and services needed — than to an IOF (see, e.g., Staatz, 1984, and
Sexton and Iskow, 1993). All of the above arguments can also be thought of as different variants
of the same general argument, namely that a cooperative ownership structure can be seen as a
5See Bontems and Fulton (2009) for a formal treatment of this argument.
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form of vertical integration (either backwards or forwards), which implies lower transaction costs
compared to an IOF.6
On the other hand, a cooperative ownership structure might aggravate the agency problem in
the relationship between owners and managers, and thereby lead to lower productive effi ciency. At
least three different (but still related) arguments have been put forward in the literature. First,
the absence of a cooperative stock market value implies a lack of external information available
to measure managerial performance, which in turn implies a larger need for internal monitoring
(Porter and Scully, 1987). Furthermore, incentives for internal monitoring might also be lower in
cooperatives because ownership tends to be highly diffused (Sexton and Iskow, 1993). Finally, com-
pared with an IOF, it might be more diffi cult to design managerial incentive schemes in cooperative
firms which align the manager’s and the owners’objectives; partly because of the more unclear and
diffuse nature of the cooperative’s objectives, and partly because of the lack of equity-based man-
agement incentives mechanisms (i.e., a stock market value) that are available to IOFs (Ortmann
and King, 2007).
There are also some other arguments derived from a non-neoclassical framework indicating that
productive effi ciency might be lower in cooperatives than in IOFs. Cook (1995) and Banerjee
et al. (2001), among others, claim that cooperatives are less effi cient because of internal rent-
seeking, where members engage in (costly) activities in order to increase their share of the generated
surplus. Furthermore, the typically higher diffusion of ownership in cooperatives might lead to lower
effi ciency due to larger costs of collective decision making (Hansmann, 1999).
Finally, there is a set of arguments which relate more specifically to allocative and scale ineffi -
ciencies of cooperatives. Porter and Scully (1987) invoke an agency cost argument in claiming that
cooperatives are likely to suffer from scale ineffi ciencies. Achieving the cost-minimising scale of
operation requires suffi cient patronage. However, since the cost of control increases as the number
of principals (patrons) increases, cooperatives tend to operate at an ineffi ciently low scale. Regard-
ing potential allocative ineffi ciencies of cooperatives, a much-discussed argument is derived from
the so-called ‘horizon problem’. Because members of a cooperative benefit from investments only
during the period in which they are members, this might erode incentives to invest in long-lived
assets whose productive life is longer than the expected period of cooperative membership. A
similar problem does not exist for IOFs, since existing shareholders can always sell their shares
6See, e.g., Nilsson (2001) for a further discussion.
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at a market value that will reflect the expected present value of future investment returns. This
potential horizon problem for cooperative investments has given rise to the ‘underinvestment hy-
pothesis’, namely that cooperatives will suffer from allocative ineffi ciencies due to underinvestment
in capital (see, e.g., Sexton and Iskow, 1993, or Ortmann and King, 2007). This is also related to
the concern that cooperatives will suffer from capital starvation because of diffi culties in accessing
external finance and because of members’ limited wealth (see Fakfakh et al., 2012, for a further
discussion). Contrary to this, though, some authors (e.g., Estrin and Jones, 1992) argue that a
cooperative ownership structure could stimulate, through positive externalities among members,
the process of collective capital accumulation, leading to the hypothesis that cooperatives will be
characterised by relative capital scarcity at the early stages of their life spans, but relative capital
abundance in later stages.
3 A brief literature review
As the discussion in the previous section shows, most of the arguments for why there might be
productivity differences between cooperatives and IOFs are general in nature and therefore apply,
at least to some extent, to all types of cooperative ownership forms. Despite this, the empirical
literature on this topic, besides being relatively scant, is divided in two distinctly separate strands.
There is a literature focussing exclusively on labour-managed firms and how this particular type
of producer cooperative compare with IOFs in terms of productivity and effi ciency. Then there is
a parallel literature addressing the same set of questions regarding cooperatives versus IOFs, but
focussing exclusively on the agricultural sector.
In the latter strand of the literature, the scope of analysis is not only restricted to the agricultural
sector, but many of the studies in this literature are also restricted to one particular industry,
namely dairy processing. The results from these studies are somewhat mixed. Porter and Scully
(1987) and Ferrier and Porter (1991) find that cooperatives are less effi cient then their investor-
owned counterparts, whereas Singh et al. (2001), Doucouliagos and Hone (2000) and Boyle (2004)
conclude that cooperatives are either equally or more effi cient than IOFs. In studies from other
agricultural industries, Akridge and Hertel (1992) find a negative effi ciency effect of a cooperative
ownership structure in the US grain and supply industry, whereas Sexton et al. (1989) find no
evidence of allocative ineffi ciency of cooperatives in the US cotton industry. On the other hand, in
a series of studies using data from the Italian wine industry, Maietta and Sena (2004, 2008, 2010)
7
find that cooperatives tend to be more effi cient than conventional firms, and that cooperative
organization is conducive to improvement in productive effi ciency in response to adversities such
as tightening financial constraints or increased competitive pressure.
In a review and discussion of the early literature on agricultural cooperatives, Sexton and Iskow
(1993) attribute the mixed results partly to a lack of relevant or reliable data in many studies,
arguing that this makes it hard to draw strong conclusions.7 In a more recent study, again based
on data from the dairy industry, Soboh et al. (2012) find that cooperatives are less effi cient when
using a traditional measure of input oriented technical effi ciency, but show that these differences
are reduced (or eliminated) when using an alternative approach that account for differences in firm
objectives emanating from the two types of ownership structure.
The (early) literature on productivity differences between labour-managed firms and IOFs is
nicely summarised by Doucouliagos (1997), who also performs a meta-analysis based on 23 sta-
tistically independent studies. A striking feature of this literature, taken as a whole, is the lack
of solid evidence for systematic differences in productivity or effi ciency between the two organiza-
tional forms. In the studies reviewed by Doucouliagos (1997), no such differences are found in the
five studies using production frontier estimates8, and in four of the five studies using regression
techniques to estimate production functions.9 The only exception is Berman and Berman (1989),
who find that labour-managed firms are less productive than IOFs in the US plywood industry.10
Furthermore, although many individual studies suggest that labour-managed firms are less capital-
intensive than IOFs, which might imply differences in total factor productivity, these differences
disappear in the meta-regressions. A different conclusion is reached in a more recent paper by
Arando et al. (2015), who perform an econometric case study of the retail chain Eroski, which is
part of the Mondragon group of worker cooperatives in the Basque Country of Spain. They find
that stores with cooperate ownership tend to be more productive than conventional stores with no
employee ownership within the same chain.
Besides drawbacks related to lack of data, and besides an absence of a clear pattern of results,
a common feature of the studies in both of the above-mentioned strands of the literature is a
narrowness of scope. In most studies, the analysis is restricted to a single industry and/or a small
7See also Soboh et al. (2009) for a more comprehensive and updated literature review.
8Porter and Scully (1987), Cote (1989), Sterner (1990), Defourny (1992) and Pollitt (1995).
9Sterner (1990), Estrin (1991), Ferrantino et al. (1995), Pollitt (1995).
10However, in a subsequent study based on more recent data from the same industry, Craig and Pencavel (1995)
find a small advantage for worker cooperatives with respect to productive effi ciency.
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sample of firms.11 A recent and notable exception is Fakhfakh et al. (2012) who study productivity
differences between labour-managed firms and IOFs using a large and representative sample of
French firms covering several industries.12 Interestingly, the authors find that labour-managed
firms are at least as effi cient as IOFs in all industries and that, on average, firms would produce
more if they all adopted the labour-managed firms’industry-specific technologies.
In the present paper, our empirical approach is much the same as in Fakfakh et al. (2012). The
main difference lies in an even wider scope of study, where we include all types of cooperatives and
make comparisons across a substantially larger number of industries. Detailed descriptions of our
data and empirical approach are given in the subsequent sections.
4 Data
We use data from the survey Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE), conducted by
the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE) for the period 2004-2012. This annual survey
includes firm-level data collected for any entity which produces goods or services in that year, in
any economic sector, regardless of its size and legal form.13 The survey also includes unique firm
identifiers which allow us to trace firms over time and conduct panel data analysis. Until 2009, the
organizational form of the firm was given by two broad categories: Sole Proprietorship (‘Empresa
em Nome Individual’) and Societies (‘Sociedades’). However, in 2010 and 2011 this classification
was further broken down and includes Cooperatives among thirty different legal forms of the firm.14
SCIE covers around one million firms every year, with the majority (65-70%) falling in the Sole
Proprietorship category. This type of firm is excluded from our analysis on the grounds that, in
practice, many such enterprises operate only on a part-time basis. In our analysis, we want to
distinguish between cooperatives and investor-owned firms. We identify cooperatives directly by
the legal form given in the data in 2010 and 2011. The residual group of firms in the Societies
category are then classified as IOFs.15
11A literature review summarising the relative performance of cooperatives versus IOFs and integrating both
strands of the literature —worker cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives —is provided by Logue and Yates (2006).
However, they apply a somewhat broader concept of performance, beyond ‘productivity’ in the strict economic
meaning of the concept, which allows them to conclude that cooperatives in general perform well relative to IOFs.
12Two separate data sets are used, covering seven and four industries, respectively.
13The only exceptions are public administration and financial services (banking and insurance), which are excluded
from the survey.
14The legal rules for cooperatives in Portugal are specified in Article 3 of ‘Código Cooperativo’, which draws on the
principles set down by the International Co-operative Alliance, including principles such as ‘democratic management’
and ‘autonomy and independence’. See Fernandes (2006) for some historical background on cooperatives in Portugal.
15We will also use a narrower definition of IOFs as a robustness check.
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Although we are able to accurately determine whether or not a firm is organized as a cooperative,
the data does not contain more detailed information about type of cooperative. However, in an
extension to our main analysis, we apply an imputation procedure developed by Monteiro and
Stewart (2015) to identify labour-managed firms and subsequently perform our analysis on a subset
of firms where the type of cooperative is restricted to worker cooperatives. In addition, when
interpreting our results, we also rely on information from other sources regarding the prevalence
of different types of cooperatives in different industries in Portugal in order to see whether cross-
industry differences in our results are systematically related to the cross-industry distribution of
different cooperative types. As we show in Section 6, there does not appear to be any clear relation
of this form.
The information in SCIE is gathered from two detailed financial statements (balance sheet
and income statement), which implies that we have a rich set of information about each firm.
Key variables, apart from type of organization, include gross output, value added, capital stock,
employment, industry affi liation, regional location and a firm birth indicator. In addition, the
data set includes workforce characteristics such as gender distribution, share of full-time workers
and share of paid workers, and information on whether the firm provides formal training to the
workforce or is involved in research activities. We also know if the firm is engaged in international
trade through import or export activities.
Unfortunately, due to a change in the accounting rules at the start of 2010, the availability and
continuity of some relevant variables were not assured. We therefore limit our main analysis to the
period from 2010 to 2012, during which all relevant variables are available. The only exception is
the detailed classification of organizational form, which, as mentioned, is only available for 2010
and 2011. We therefore extrapolate, for each firm, the organizational form of 2010-2011 to 2012
and also make the assumption that firms born in 2012 are investor-owned.16 ,17 In order to facilitate
a cross-industry analysis, we also follow the approach of Fakhfakh et al. (2012) and drop industries
(defined at the 5-digit level) where cooperatives are absent or represent less than 2% of the firms
in that industry.18 With these restrictions, and after some standard cleaning of the data, our final
sample consists of 685 cooperatives and 10,164 IOFs.
16No firm changed the organisational form between 2010 and 2011, which suggests that extrapolation to 2012
might be innocuous, although we have no information on entry of cooperatives in 2012.
17We check the robustness of our approach in two different (and opposite) ways: (i) using only with data from
2010 and 2011, and (ii) extending the extrapolation of firm types to 2015.
18As a robustness check, we also perform the aggregate-level analysis without this restriction.
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Each firm in our sample is classified as belonging to one of thirteen different industries, where
this classification of industries is based on a mildly aggregated version of the offi cial 2-digit classi-
fication. In Figure 1 we display how cooperatives are distributed across these 13 industries.19 We
see that cooperatives are reasonably well represented across a wide spectrum of economic activity.
In most industries, the share of cooperatives lies somewhere in the interval of 5-15%. Excep-
tions are Textile, clothing and other, Other manufacturing, Retail trade and Artistic and cultural
associations, where the share of cooperatives is less than 5%.20 At the other end, cooperatives
are relatively strongly present in industries such as Food, Beverages and Social work, where they
constitute around 15% of the total number of firms.
[ Figure 1 here ]
Mean values of the main variables in our sample are reported in Table 1, where the statisti-
cal significance (given by a t-test) of the difference between the means of these variables for the
two groups of firms (cooperatives and IOFs) is presented in the last column. It is evident that
cooperatives produce, on average, more than IOFs. The output differential is large (35%) and
statistically significant. It is even larger (50%) if output is alternatively measured by value added
(not shown in the table). More generally, whether measured by input use or output, cooperatives
are (on average) considerably larger than IOFs. This feature is consistent with a recent study on
cooperatives versus IOFs in Portugal using a different data set (Monteiro and Stewart, 2015), and
it is also consistent with the characteristics of the European dairy sector, where cooperatives are
prevalent (Soboh et al., 2012). However, it contrasts with much of the existing literature, which
does not show a consistently clear pattern in terms of the relative size of cooperatives, although
prior evidence is mainly sectorial and/or restricted to labour managed firms.21
19When making our industry classification, we have tried to maximise the level of disaggregation while still ensuring
a suffi ciently large sample size in each category. Notice also that Agriculture and other includes forestry and fishing,
and that Food and Beverages belong to the manufacturing sector.
20Although we have imposed a minimum threshold of 2% cooperatives in each industry (at the 5-digit level), data
cleaning has brought the cooperative share below this threshold in the Other manufacturing category.
21See, e.g., Fakhfakh et al. (2012) on France, Pencavel et al. (2006) or Jones (2007) on Italy, and George (1982)
on Denmark.
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[ Table 1 here ]
Cooperatives in Portugal also appear to be more capital intensive than IOFs. This is also
confirmed by more disaggregated figures, which shows that the capital-labour ratio of cooperatives
is at least as high as for IOFs in 10 out of the 13 industries considered in our study. This also runs
counter to prior evidence showing that cooperatives tend to be less capital intensive than IOFs (see,
e.g., Doucouliagos, 1997, and Jones, 2007), although, once more, this evidence is mainly restricted
to worker cooperatives.22
The composition of the workforce also differs between the two groups, with cooperatives em-
ploying a significantly lower share of full-time and male workers, on average. This confirms previous
work on Portuguese cooperatives (Monteiro and Stewart, 2015) but contrasts with other evidence
showing that the share of male workers in cooperatives is either similar or higher than in IOFs
(e.g., Fakhfakh et al., 2012, or Bartlett et al., 1992).
Regarding the other variables, the considerably lower birth rate of cooperatives relative to IOFs
is a well-established and documented fact. Another noticeable difference is that, while cooperatives
do not differ from IOFs in terms of export activities, the share of firms that import goods is
significantly lower for cooperatives than for IOFs. This might reflect the importance of local
linkages often associated with cooperatives (Bartlett et al., 1992).23
5 Empirical strategy
We test for productivity differences between cooperatives and IOFs by estimating different variants
of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs (similar to, e.g., Harris et
22On the other hand, Fakhfakh et al. (2012) find no significant difference in capital intensity between cooperatives
and labour-managed firms.
23 In some cases local linkages might be compulsory, for example in the case of agricultural cooperatives that are
obliged to buy inputs (raw materials) from their members.
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al., 2005). Our most general specification is given by24
lnYit = β0 + (β1 lnLit + β2 lnKit + β3 lnMit) IOF
+(β4 + β5 lnLit + β6 lnKit + β7 lnMit)COOP (1)






φikREGik + ai + νt + εit,
where Y is real gross output, L is total employment, K is tangible fixed assets, M is real interme-
diate inputs, and IOF and COOP are two binary variables that equal, respectively, 1 and 0 (0 and
1) if the firm is an IOF (a cooperative). This specification implies that we allow the production
function of cooperatives and IOFs to differ with respect to the intercept (measured by β4), the
marginal product of labour (measured by β5 − β1), the marginal product of capital (measured by
β6−β2) and the marginal product of materials (measured by β7−β3). Allowing for such a flexibility
is in line with most of the agency-based arguments for why cooperatives and IOFs might differ in
terms of productive effi ciency, which are related to incentive effects that might be embodied in the
production factors of the two organizational forms.
Among the other control variables, WF is a vector of three variables that control for the
workforce composition of each firm. It includes the share of full-time workers, the share of unpaid
workers and the gender composition of the workforce. Furthermore, OFA is a vector of five indicator
variables used to control whether the firm provides training, performs R&D activities, is a start-
up, or is engaged in international trade through imports or exports. We control for market power
by including the variable HHI, which is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration
defined at the five-digit level of economic activity classification in each year. We also add a dummy
variable (EA) indicating the economic activity (based on the 13 industries defined in the previous
section), and another indicator variable, REG, that is equal to one if the firm is located in a specific
region defined at NUTS 2 of Portugal. Finally, we include a firm-fixed effect (ai) and a year-fixed
effect (vt). Given the wide scope of our analysis, using data from all economic sectors, we convert all
financial variables to real terms (Prices = 2012) using deflators defined according to three broadly
homogeneous economic sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services (source: AMECO).
We estimate our production function using two different estimation strategies. As a benchmark,
we use a random-effects model (GLS) applied to our three-year unbalanced panel sample. The
24As a robustness check, we also estimate a translog production function (see Section 6.1.1).
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects clearly rejects OLS estimation,
and the presence of the time invariant COOP variable does not allow us to perform a fixed-effects
estimation of Eq. (1).25 Thus, we present results from GLS estimations.
However, there are two sources of potential bias in the results derived from the random-effects
model. First, there is an endogeneity issue related to a potential simultaneity of input and output
level decisions. Second, there might be some unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated
with the choice of being organised as a cooperative or as an IOF. In order to deal with these potential
problems, and similarly to Fakhfakh et al. (2012), we also present results using a System-GMM
estimator, which is our most preferred empirical strategy. Although our productivity estimates are
based on the 2010-2012 period, most of the variables in our data are available for the period 2004-
2012, which allows us to use lagged variables as instruments and therefore perform System-GMM
estimations.26
The System-GMM estimator is an extended version of the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) of Arellano and Bond (1991) that combines lagged values of variables as instruments
for the first-differenced equations with equations in levels with lagged variables in differences as
instruments (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Like the GMM estimator, the System-GMM estimator is
suffi ciently flexible to account for the endogeneity of inputs and for a possible correlation between
unobserved firm characteristics and organizational form that affects output.27 However, because
the System-GMM estimator exploits additional moment conditions inherent in adopting a system
of equations in differences and in levels, it also allows us to recover the effect of the time-invariant
COOP variable, which is crucial to our analysis.
Our System-GMM estimations are derived using the following procedure. We eliminate the firm-
fixed effect in the equations in differences using orthogonal deviations instead of a first-difference
transformation. We choose orthogonal deviations in order to minimise the gap effect in our short
and unbalanced panel.28 The interactions with the three inputs for cooperatives and IOFs, and
variables regarding workforce composition (shares of full-time workers, upaid workers and males)
and firm attributes (training, R&D, exports, imports) are all treated as endogenous variables. We
use two and longer lags of their levels as instruments for the orthogonal deviation equation and
25 In our data, there are no firms that change their ownership structure from cooperative to IOF or vice versa.
26One important exception is K, which is only available from 2010, implying that only the 2012 observations of
this variable is instrumented in the System-GMM estimations.
27See Syverson (2011) for a further discussion of the endogeneity problem associated with the estimation of
production functions.
28Roodman (2009) gives several advises on how to optimally implement the difference and system-GMM estimators.
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lagged first differences as instruments for the level equation.29 Following Jones (2007), we treat
COOP as a pre-determined variable.30 We use first and longer lags for the transformed equation
and lag 0 of the instrumenting variable in differences for the levels equation.31 The remaining
variables (firm birth, market concentration and year) are considered to be exogenous. In order to
test the validity of the instruments used and to support the approach used, we report the Hansen
statistic. Finally, we report statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation,
using a two-step GMM estimation procedure, following the correction proposed by Windmeijer
(2005).
6 Results
Our results are presented in two stages. First, we show the results from estimation of Eq. (1)
using all firms in our sample. This gives us an estimate of the aggregate productivity differences
between cooperative and IOF. We then proceed by estimating Eq. (1) at industry level, using the
industry classification detailed in Section 4, in order to explore how productivity differences between
cooperatives and IOFs are distributed across different industries. At both stages of the analysis, we
will present several extensions and robustness checks regarding sample selection, specification of the
production function, time frame of the analysis, and variable definitions. In each case considered,
we present results from both GLS and System-GMM estimations.
6.1 Aggregate productivity differences
Estimation results for different variants of Eq. (1), using the whole sample of firms, are presented in
Table 2. The GLS estimates are reported in Columns 1-4. The estimates in Column 1 are based on a
version of Eq. (1) that includes only the three inputs in addition to industry-, region- and time-fixed
effects. In subsequent columns, we show similar estimates when more controls are cumulatively
added to the model, such as workforce composition (Column 2), firm attributes on training, R&D,
start-up, and imports/exports (Column 3), and information on market concentration (Column 4).
Finally, the estimates based on System-GMM (with all controls included) are presented in Column
29Usually we use lags 2 to 4, but in some instances we adjust the initial and longest lags in order to pass the
Hansen test .
30The Difference-in-Hansen test validates the instruments used for this variable.
31Usually we use lags 1 to 3, but in some instances we adjust the longest lag in order to pass the Hansen test .
15
5.32 Table 2 also reports p-values indicating whether each of the coeffi cients associated with the
three inputs are significantly different for the two types of firms, and whether these three coeffi cients
and the intercept of the production function are jointly different.
[ Table 2 here ]
There are significant differences between the results based on the two different empirical ap-
proaches. The GLS estimations indicate that cooperatives and IOFs use significantly different
production technologies, and that these differences are related to differences in the intercept (which
is lower for cooperatives) and in the marginal products of both labour (which is lower for cooper-
atives) and capital (which is higher for cooperatives). The size and significance of the estimated
coeffi cients, and their differences across the two groups of firms, are fairly consistent across the
four different specifications of the model (Columns 1-4). The estimated input parameters are also
stable across different specifications.
For the GLS estimations, the remaining coeffi cients appear with the expected sign and are all
statistically significant. Output increases (decreases) with the share of full-time (unpaid) workers,
and is also higher in firms that provide training and engage in R&D. Involvement in international
trade, in particular exports, is also associated with higher output. This accords with the well-
known empirical findings that exporters tend to be among the most productive firms.33 Firms are
also less productive in their first year of activity and tend to be more productive when operating
in more concentrated industries. Finally, there also appears to be a small productivity advantage
associated with a higher share of male workers, but the statistical significance of this relationship
is relatively weak.
When we use the System-GMM approach, the estimated coeffi cients are different in magni-
tude (compared to the GLS estimates) but still economically meaningful. However, the estimated
technological differences between cooperatives and IOFs vanish to a large extent when using the
System-GMM approach. Although the p-value of 0.14 is not very high, we cannot, based on the
32 In the System-GMM estimations, the Hansen test (p-value = 0.146) does not reject the validity of the overall
instruments used (84), and the Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value = 0.919) validates the instruments used for COOP
as a pre-determined variable.
33See, e.g., Wagner (2007) for a survey of the empirical literature on the relationship between exports and pro-
ductivity.
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System-GMM estimations, statistically reject the hypothesis that cooperatives and IOFs use similar
technologies.
6.1.1 Are cooperatives more productive than IOFs?
When we estimate a production function where we allow the technology to differ between coopera-
tives and IOFs along several different dimensions, we cannot conclude directly from the estimated
coeffi cients in Table 2 whether cooperatives are more or less effi cient than their investor-owned
counterparts. Put differently, our flexible formulation of the production function given by Eq. (1)
implies that we cannot measure differences in total factor productivity by a single coeffi cient. We
therefore follow the approach of Fakhfakh et al. (2012) and compare the predicted output of co-
operatives and IOFs using, in turn, each of the two sets of estimated parameters. In other words,
we keep the estimated technology constant and calculate whether cooperatives (IOFs), with their
respective input use, will produce more or less with their own technology compared with the tech-
nology of IOFs (cooperatives). This approach gives us two sets of estimates of potential differences
in productive effi ciency between the two categories of firms.
Based on the full sample of firms, the predicted outputs of each type of firm, when using each
of the two estimated technologies, are given in the first row (based on GLS estimates) and second
row (based on System-GMM estimates) in Table 3 below. For cooperatives, each value reported
in the column labelled "Coop technology" is the predicted output, given the actual input use of
cooperatives, based on the estimated production function for cooperatives. On the other hand,
each value reported in the column labelled "IOF technology" is the predicted output, again given
the actual input use of cooperatives, based on the estimated production function of IOFs. The
difference between these predicted outputs (reported in the column labelled "Diff") can then be
interpreted as the predicted output gain for the ‘average’cooperative firm of using its own technology
instead of the technology of the ‘average’investor-owned firm, when the input use is kept constant
(at the actual level). The interpretation of the reported values in the columns referring to IOFs is
obviously equivalent.
For estimates based on GLS, the reported figures based on the overall sample show a very clear
and consistent picture. For a given input use, cooperatives would increase output by adopting
the technology of IOFs, and, vice versa, IOFs would reduce output by adopting the technology of
cooperatives. These differences are highly statistically significant and also of quite similar magni-
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tude. In other words, cooperatives use, on average, a less effi cient technology than investor-owned
firms. Notice also that the estimated productivity differentials are of considerable magnitude. For
example, our GLS estimates indicate that, on average, a cooperative firm could increase its output
by almost 60% (without using more inputs) by replacing its technology with an ‘IOF technology’.34
The estimates based on System-GMM paint a roughly similar picture, although they do not
allow us draw conclusions with the same degree of confidence. The sign of the productivity differ-
entials, which go in the same direction as the differentials based on GLS estimates, are actually of
a larger magnitude, but with a lower degree of statistical significance. The predicted output loss
of IOFs if they adopt the technology of cooperatives is (weakly) statistically significant, whereas
the predicted output gain of cooperatives if they adopt the technology of IOFs is not statistically
significant, though the p-value of 0.15 is not that high.
[ Table 3 here ]
Overall, our estimates of aggregate productivity differences between cooperatives and IOFs
suggest that cooperatives are (on average) less productive, but the confidence with which we can
draw this conclusion depends somewhat on the chosen empirical approach.
6.1.2 Robustness and extensions
In Table 3 we also show the results of a series of robustness checks and extensions, in each case
reporting estimates from both empirical strategies (GLS and System-GMM).35 These alternative
estimations are based on the following criteria:
(i) Value added. As an alternative to estimating real gross output, we estimate real value added,
which implies that Materials is excluded as an independent variable in Eq. (1).36 The resulting
productivity estimates are reported in the 3rd and 4th rows of Table 3.
34The estimated productivity differential of 0.465 is, in percentage terms, equivalent to
e0.465 − 1 = 0.59201.
35 In Table 3 we only report results from the counterfactual exercise of substituting the technology used by each
category of firms, based on the estimated production functions for each firm type. The underlying estimated produc-
tion function coeffi cients, for each of the robustness checks and extensions, are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the
Appendix.
36Notice that this variable is not constructed but given directly by the data set and available for a somewhat
larger number of firms.
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(ii) Narrower definition of IOFs. In the main analysis we have defined IOFs as a residual
category consisting of all firms that are not classified as cooperatives in the data. As an alternative,
we also adopt a narrower definition, where a firm is classified as an IOF if, in the data, it is listed as
a private or public liability company.37 This implies a reduction in the number of firms by around
9%. Results based on this alternative definition of IOFs are presented in the 5th and 6th rows of
Table 3.
(iii) Using only data from 2010 and 2011. Our main results are based on a sample in which the
data on organizational form —cooperative or IOF —is imputed for the year 2012, where we assume
that the organizational form remains unchanged from 2011 to 2012 and where firms created in 2012
are classified as IOFs. Under these assumptions, if cooperatives created in 2012 are less productive
than IOFs, our productivity differential estimates reported in the first and second rows of Table 3
are likely to be downward biased. The 7th and 8th rows of Table 3 report estimates based on data
only from 2010 and 2011.
(iv) Data cleaning. The main sample is constructed by removing industries in which the in-
cidence of cooperatives is less than 2%. To check whether our results are sensitive to this data
cleaning decision, we report, in the 9th and 10th rows of Table 3, the productivity estimates based
on a sample where firms in all industries that include at least one cooperative firm are included.
(v) Firm size. We also explore if and how productivity differences between cooperatives and
IOFs depend on firm size. We do this by splitting the sample into two categories: micro firms
(defined as firms with less than ten workers) and larger firms (with a workforce of at least ten
workers). Estimates based on these two subsamples are given in Rows 11-12 and 13-14, respectively,
in Table 3.
(vi) Translog production function. Our benchmark results are based on estimations of Cobb-
Douglas production functions. As a robustness check, we also estimate the following Transcendental
37These categories correspond to "sociedade por quotas", "sociedade anónima", "sociedade em comandita" and
"sociedade em nome colectivo".
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Logarithmic (‘translog’) production function:
lnYit = β0 +

β1 lnLit + β2 lnKit + β3 lnMit
+γ1 (lnLit)
2 + γ2 (lnKit)
2 + γ3 (lnMit)
2




β4 + β5 lnLit + β6 lnKit + β7 lnMit
+γ7 (lnLit)
2 + γ8 (lnKit)
2 + γ9 (lnMit)
2
+γ10 (lnLit) (lnKit) + γ11 (lnLit) (lnMit) + γ12 (lnKit) (lnMit)
COOP (2)






φikREGik + ai + νt + εit.
The results based on this alternative technology specification are reported in Rows 15-16 of Table
3.
(vii) Labour-managed firms. A weakness of our data is that we are not able to identify the
exact type of cooperative with certainty. However, by applying an imputation procedure used by
Monteiro and Stewart (2015), we are able to identify one particular type of cooperatives, namely
labour-managed firms (LMFs), with a reasonable degree of approximation.38 This allows us to
investigate whether this particular type of cooperative is different from the overall population of
cooperatives in terms of productive effi ciency. Rows 17-18 in Table 3 report productivity estimates
based on a sample where we restrict the type of cooperatives to LMFs.
(viii) Sample size. Because of the relatively low incidence of cooperatives in most industries,
the samples of cooperatives and IOFs used in the main analysis are of very different size. In order
to check if this has any impact on our results, we redo the analysis using a smaller sample of IOFs
that are more comparable to the sample of cooperatives. We perform two different versions of
this robustness check, using two different sample selection criteria. In the first version, we draw
a representative sample of 8% of the IOFs in each year based on firm size and industrial activity.
In the second version, we select a number of IOFs that is identical to the number of cooperatives,
for each year, using a matching procedure based on firm size, industry and region. The results are
shown in Rows 19-22 in Table 3.
(iv) Longer panel. Another weakness of our analysis is that we have a short panel, due to
38The imputation procedure itself is identical to the one used by Stewart and Monteiro (2015), and we refer to
that paper for a detailed description the procedure. The additional step performed in the present study is that we
also convert the previous classification of economic activities (CAE REV 2.1) to the one used in the present data set
(CAE REV 3).
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the fact that firm type (cooperative or IOF) is only identified in the years 2010 and 2011. Our
main analysis is based on a panel where we extrapolate firm classification one year forward, to
2012. However, we have also redone the analysis by using a longer panel where we extend the
extrapolation to (and including) the year 2015. Unfortunately, the Hansen test did not validate the
instruments used in the System-GMM estimation and we therefore report only the results based
on GLS (in the last row of Table 3).39
The overall picture emanating from Table 3 is that the System-GMM results tend to be more
sensitive to different specifications and sample selection criteria than the results based on GLS
estimations. The GLS results are remarkably stable across all the different alternatives considered
in Table 3. Not only are all the estimated productivity differentials in the same direction, and all
estimated with a very high degree of precision, but the magnitudes of these productivity differentials
are also highly robust to all robustness checks and extensions. Interestingly, the largest difference
from the benchmark results occurs when the sample of cooperatives is restricted to LMFs, where it
appears that the disadvantage in productive effi ciency is even higher for LMFs than for the average
cooperative firm.
Although the results based on System-GMM are less robust to different specifications and sample
selection criteria, there is still some consistency across the different alternatives. In almost all cases,
the estimated productivity differentials have the same sign and are consistent with the GLS results.
The only exceptions are when we estimate value added and when we consider only larger firms, but
the estimated differences in productivity are very far from being statistically significant in these
cases.
However, although the System-GMM approach yields productivity differentials of mostly the
same sign as the GLS estimates, these differentials are estimated with a considerably lower degree
of precision in System-GMM. There are two notable exceptions though. First, the estimated pro-
ductivity differentials turn highly statistically significant when restricting the sample to the years
2010 and 2011, even if this makes the panel even shorter. This might indicate that our extrapo-
lation strategy is not innocuous. If cooperatives are really less productive than IOFs, and since
cooperatives that enter the market after 2011 will be (wrongly) classified as IOFs, extrapolation of
firm type for years beyond 2011 will lead to an underestimation of the true productivity differen-
tial between cooperatives and IOFs. The fact that the magnitude of the productivity differentials
39With the longer panel, the System-GMM approach produced valid instruments at industry level. These results
are presented in Section 6.2.
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based on GLS estimates decreases monotonically with the length of the extrapolation period, might
suggest that such a bias exists.40
Second, the results from the System-GMM approach seem to depend crucially on firm size.
More specifically, there are statistically significant productivity differences between cooperatives
and IOFs, with the former being less productive than the latter, if we only consider firms with less
than 10 employees (‘micro firms’). For larger firms, the estimated productivity differences (using
System-GMM) are much smaller in magnitude and far from being statistically significant.
6.2 Industry-specific productivity differences
In order to investigate if and how productivity differences between cooperatives and IOFs differ
across industries, we make separate estimations for each of the 13 industries specified in Section 4.
We initially make this industry decomposition by estimating Eq. (1) using the our main sample.
Subsequently, we show equivalent results for three of the robustness checks detailed in the previous
sub-sample, (i) estimating the translog function specified in Eq. (2) instead of the Cobb-Douglas
function specified in Eq. (1), (ii) estimating Eq. (1) on a sub-sample of LMFs, and (iii) estimating
Eq. (1) on a longer panel where we extrapolate the classification of firm type until the year 2015.
As before, we report both GLS and System-GMM estimates.41
6.2.1 Benchmark estimations
Industry-specific productivity differentials based on estimations of Eq. (1) using our main sample
are reported in Table 4. For the GLS estimates, we find that the results from the aggregate analysis
are partly or fully confirmed also at industry level. In 8 out of the 13 industries, cooperatives are
found to be significantly and consistently less productive then IOFs, in the sense that cooperatives
would significantly increase their output if they adopted the IOF technology, whereas IOFs would
significantly reduce their outputs if adopting the cooperative technology.42 These productivity
differentials are particularly large in industries such as Agriculture and other, Electricity, water and
construction, and Social work. In the remaining industries the estimated productivity differentials
40The estimates reported in Table 3 show that, with the GLS approach, the estimated productivity differentials
are largest for the case of no extrapolation and smallest for the case of extrapolation until 2015 (long panel).
41For each industry we only show the estimated productivity differentials for the two counterfactual scenarios,
as in Table 3. The underlying regression outputs of the estimated production functions are too space consuming to
display in the paper and are therefore are available upon request.
42These industries are Agriculture and other; Food; Electricity, water and construction; Wholesale trade; Retail
trade; Education; Social work; Artistic and cultural associations.
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go in the same direction (implying that cooperatives are less productive), but where these estimates
are either not significant or not consistently significant.43
[ Table 4 here ]
It is also interesting to note that, based on the GLS estimates, the underperformance of cooper-
atives is consistent across very different sectors, with a very different representation of cooperatives
in terms of type. For example, supplier-owned cooperatives is the dominant type of cooperative in
industries such as Agriculture and other, and Artistic and cultural associations, whereas, in Elec-
tricity, water and construction, consumer cooperatives, worker cooperatives and supplier-owned
cooperatives coexist.44 The fact that the estimated relative ineffi ciency of cooperatives is negative
and large in all these industries suggest that the productive ineffi ciency of cooperatives does not
seem to depend particularly on the type of cooperative. This is consistent with our theoretical
discussion in Section 2 where we show that many of the agency-based arguments regarding the
productive (in)effi ciency of cooperatives are general in nature, and do not exclusively apply to a
particular type of cooperative.
When using the System-GMM approach, the results are considerably less clear-cut. In two
industries —Retail trade and Social work —cooperatives are found to be significantly less productive
than IOFs in a consistent way. However, for the other industries, the estimated productivity
differentials tend not to be statistically significant. In 5 of these remaining industries, the sign of
the estimates suggest that cooperatives are less productive, whereas, in another 5 industries, the
opposite appears to be the case.
Summing up, the results in Table 4 reveal that, in all cases where the estimated differences in
productivity are statistically significant in both of the counterfactual scenarios, cooperatives are
found to be less productive than IOFs. However, these cases are much more prevalent for the
GLS-estimates than for estimates based on System-GMM.
43The phrase ‘not consistently significant’refers to cases where cooperatives would significantly increase their out-
put by adopting the IOF technology but IOFs would not significantly reduce their output by adopting the cooperative
technology, or vice versa.
44See Monteiro and Stewart (2015) for an overview of how different types of cooperatives are distributed across
industries in Portugal.
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6.2.2 Translog production function
Table 5 reports estimated productivity differentials based on estimations of Eq. (2). For the GLS-
estimates, the results are very similar to the results in Table 4 based on estimations of Eq. (1).
Again, in 8 out of 13 industries cooperatives are found to be significantly (and consistently) less
productive than IOFs. Furthermore, comparing these eight industries with the eight industries for
which a similar result was found in Table 4, seven of them are common. Thus, the productivity
estimates based on GLS appear to be highly robust to the specification of a translog (instead of a
Cobb-Douglas) production function.
[ Table 5 here ]
As before, the estimation results based on System-GMM are less clear-cut. However, it appears
that the translog specification makes these results less ambiguous and qualitatively more in line with
the GLS-results. In 6 out of 13 industries, the estimated productivity differentials are statistically
significant in one of the two counterfactual scenarios, and in each case with a sign indicating that
cooperatives are less productive.45 Furthermore, in 5 of these 6 industries, the non-significant
productivity differential (in the other counterfactual scenario) has a sign that is consistent with
the statistically significant differential. Four of these industries overlap with the set of industries in
which the GLS-estimates yield significant (and consistent) productivity differences. There are also a
further three industries in which the System-GMM approach yields productivity differentials whose
sign suggest, in a consistent way, that cooperatives are less productive, although these estimates
are not statistically significant.
6.2.3 Labour-managed firms
We have also estimated industry-specific productivity differentials, based on Eq. (1), on a sub-
sample of firms in which the cooperatives are restricted to LMFs (following the previously described
identification procedure). In Table 6 we report the results for the 6 industries in which there
are enough LMFs to perform the estimations. The results based on the GLS estimations show
much the same pattern as the results based on equivalent estimations using the main sample. In
three industries —Agriculture and other, Textile, clothing and other, and Education —LMFs are
significantly and consistently less productive than IOFs. In two further industries —Electricity,
45These industries are Agriculture and other; Electricity, water and construction; Storage, hotels, media and other;
Social work; Artistic and cultural associations; Other associations.
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water and construction, and Wholesale trade —LMFs are significantly less productive according to
one of the two counterfactual scenarios. Only in Other manufacturing do we find no significant
evidence of any productivity differences between LMFs and IOFs.
In 5 of the 6 industries where we find significant evidence of underperformance by LMFs, we
find similar evidence of underperformance by cooperatives more generally (cf. Table 4). One
interesting exception is Textile, clothing and other, where we find strong evidence that LMFs are
less productive when restricting the sample to only include this type of cooperative, but where we
do not find significant productivity differences in the larger sample including all cooperatives.
[ Table 6 here ]
However, our results based on System-GMM are much less conclusive, as we find no significant
evidence that LMFs are underperforming in terms of productive effi ciency in any of the six indus-
tries. The closest we get to any indication of underperformance is in Agriculture and other, where
the sign of the productivity differentials in the two counterfactual scenarios suggest that LMFs are
less productive, and where the p-values of these estimates are relatively low (0.12 and 0.15). In the
other five industries, all estimated productivity differentials based on System-GMM are far from
being statistically significant.
6.2.4 Longer panel
Finally, we also estimate Eq. (1) at industry level using a longer panel where we, based on informa-
tion in the years 2010-2011, extrapolate firm classifications for the years 2012-2015. The resulting
estimated productivity differentials are shown in Table 7.
[ Table 7 here ]
The results based on GLS-estimates are very robust to this extrapolation in order to obtain a
longer panel. We find statistically significant and consistent underperformance of cooperatives in
the same 8 industries as we do when using the shorter panel (cf. Table 4).
Once more, however, the results based on System-GMM-estimates are very inconclusive. In
fact, we find significant (though not consistent) evidence of cooperatives being more productive
in two industries and less productive in a third industry. But mostly, the estimated productivity
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differentials are not statistically significant. As previously mentioned, this might be partly explained
by the (biased) noise introduced by the extrapolation strategy.
7 Summary and discussion
In this paper we have empirically analysed if cooperatives are superior to investor-owned firms
(IOFs) in terms of productive effi ciency. We have done so by using panel data methods to estimate
productivity differentials between the two categories of firms, based on three years (2010-2012) of
firm-level data covering a wide range of Portuguese industries. Estimations from our benchmark
random-effects model suggest that cooperatives are, on average, considerably less productive than
their investor-owned counterparts, and this result applies to a majority of the thirteen industries
considered. Our results based on GLS-estimations are also remarkably stable and consistent across
a wide set of robustness checks and extensions.
However, our estimates based on the preferred System-GMM-approach are both less conclusive
and considerably more sensitive to different specifications and sample selection criteria. At aggre-
gate level, the System-GMM-results are more consistent with the GLS-results for micro firms and
when using a sample consisting only of observations from 2010 and 2011, in which we have infor-
mation about firm type. At industry level, the highest degree of correspondence between the two
sets of results occurs when we use a translog production function. The less conclusive nature of the
System-GMM results indicates that we should interpret the GLS-results with some caution, and
we cannot conclusively state that cooperatives are generally less productive than IOFs. Regard-
less of which empirical approach we use, though, we find no consistent and statistically significant
evidence that cooperatives are more productive than IOFs in any industry.
For the cases where we find indications of underperformance of cooperatives, what are the
potential explanations? In general, productivity differences might be related to unobserved (and
therefore unmeasured) input characteristics that differ systematically between cooperatives and
IOFs. One possibility is that there are differences in the quality of labour used by the two types
of firms. The lack of information in our data on worker characteristics such as schooling implies
that the estimated productivity differences might partially be explained by differences in labour
quality. However, this hypothesis is not supported by available information from other sources,
which suggest that cooperatives tend to employ, on average, more educated workers than IOFs
(Monteiro and Stewart, 2015).
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Productivity differences might also be partly explained by differences in the degree of compe-
tition, which affects output prices as well as the competitive pressure to be productive. Indeed,
the descriptive statistics show that cooperatives tend to operative, on average, in less competitive
industries. However, since we control for the degree of industry concentration (by the HHI) in
the regressions, we should in principle be able to neutralise such effects, at least the effects that
are directly related to competitive pressure. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that
cooperatives in some cases face below-average output prices in less competitive markets, and that
some of our productivity results can partly be explained by this.
Another potential source of productivity differences is differences in the characteristics of the
manager, such as managerial talent and effort, which is arguably the most important unmeasured
input to production, and which is generally recognised as a potentially important explanation for
productivity differences across otherwise similar firms (Syverson, 2011). To the extent that we find
indications of cooperatives being relatively ineffi cient, potential explanations related to managerial
practices are in line with the theoretical discussion presented in Section 2, which points to agency
problems between owners and managers as a main source of productive ineffi ciency in cooperatives.
There is also some empirical evidence that exit rates of high-ability individuals tend to be higher
in cooperatives, which might contribute to a relative lack of managerial talent (Abramitzky, 2008;
Burdin, 2016). However, without the data needed for further investigation, it is not possible to
elevate this explanation beyond the status of qualified speculation.
Finally, we would also like to relate our results to those of Monteiro and Stewart (2015), who
find that cooperatives in Portugal tend to have a higher probability of survival than their investor-
owned counterparts. This finding is seemingly at odds with any indications of cooperatives being
less effi cient than IOFs. However, once we account for heterogeneity across industries and firm
characteristics, the results in the present study are not particularly inconsistent with the survival
results in Monteiro and Stewart (2015).
For example, Monteiro and Stewart find that the significantly higher survival rate of cooperatives
only applies for manufacturing firms, whereas, in a sector like agriculture, the survival rate of
cooperatives is significantly lower than for IOFs. It is interesting to note that, in our industry-level
analysis, it is precisely in the manufacturing industries that the evidence for cooperatives being
less productive is weakest. In the four industries that comprise the manufacturing sector (Food ;
Beverages; Textile, clothing and other ; and Other manufacturing), a significant and consistent
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finding of relative ineffi ciency of cooperatives is found only in the Food industry, and only for
the GLS estimates. With the System-GMM approach, we do not find significant productivity
differences in any of these industries.
Furthermore, when splitting the data according to firm size, Monteiro and Stewart find that
the higher survival rate of cooperatives only applies to large firms (with more than 50 employees).
Again, it is interesting to note that, in our aggregate analysis, the strongest evidence of ineffi cient
cooperatives appears for small firms (less than 10 employees), where the estimated productivity
differentials are significant and consistent under both estimation methods (GLS and System-GMM).
On a more general note, though, it is also worth emphasizing that, since cooperatives and IOFs
have different objectives, the decision of whether or not to exit the industry might be based on
quite different considerations for these two types of firms, which in turn makes it harder to relate
differences in survival probability directly to differences in productive effi ciency.
Appendix
The results from the estimations of Eq. (1), based on the main sample and for each of the robustness
checks and extensions listed in Section 6.1.2, are shown in Table A1 (GLS estimations) and Table
A2 (System-GMM estimations). Regression results from the estimation of Eq. (2) are shown in
Table A3.
[ Tables A1-A3 here ]
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Figure 1: Distribution of cooperatives across industries 
Number of COOPs
Share of COOPs
Table 1 - Variable means by type of firm, 2010-12
Cooperatives IOFs Differencea)
ln real gross output 12.227 11.878 0.349 ***
Inputs
  ln L 2.168 1.540 0.628 ***
  ln K    12.284 10.886 1.398 ***
  ln M     11.920 11.403 0.517 ***
  ln(K/L) 10.115 9.346 0.769 ***
Workforce composition
  Full-time workers (%) 0.924 0.955 -0.031 ***
  Unpaid workers (%) 0.088 0.087 0.001
  Males (%) 0.518 0.568 -0.050 ***
Other firm attributes
  Training indicator 0.128 0.122 0.006
  R&D indicator 0.011 0.008 0.003
  Firm birth indicator 0.004 0.042 -0.038 ***
  Export indicator 0.191 0.209 -0.018
  Import indicator 0.256 0.323 -0.067 ***
Market concentration
  HHI 0.110 0.082 0.028 ***
Location
  North 0.324 0.321 0.003
  Algarve 0.037 0.040 -0.003
  Center 0.252 0.258 -0.006
  Lisbon 0.122 0.211 -0.089 ***
  Alentejo 0.182 0.132 0.050 ***
  Azores 0.072 0.018 0.054 ***
  Madeira 0.011 0.019 -0.008 *
# observations 1,697 22,879
# firms 685 10,164
Notes: *** and * indicate that the mean difference between cooperatives and non-cooperatives is
statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. a) Standard errors are clustered at firm
level.
Table 2 - Cobb-Douglas regression results, log(output) as dependent variable
System-GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COOP -1.486*** -1.417*** -1.504*** -1.499*** 0.414
(0.327) (0.328) (0.326) (0.326) (2.344)
Inputs - IOFs
ln L 0.584*** 0.572*** 0.553*** 0.553*** 0.284***  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.091)
ln K 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.111** *
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.059)   
ln M 0.335*** 0.331*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.582***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.066)
Inputs - COOPs
ln L 0.448*** 0.441*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.419**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.204)
ln K 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.201
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.127)
ln M 0.356*** 0.350*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.329*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.169)
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) 0.178*** 0.182*** 0.183*** -0.233
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.581)
Unpaid workers (%) -0.282*** -0.267*** -0.267*** 0.088
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.336)
Males (%) 0.051* 0.053* 0.052* -1.611**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.640)
Other firm attributes
Training indicator 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.262
(0.015) (0.015) (0.194)
R&D indicator 0.114** 0.113** 0.167
(0.045) (0.045) (0.171)
Firm birth indicator -0.442*** -0.442*** -0.338***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.073)
Export indicator 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.178**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.087)
Import indicator 0.075*** 0.075*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.092)
Market concentration (HHI) 0.168** 0.530***
(0.086) (0.192)
Industry + region + year FE Y Y Y Y Y
P-value for differences in technology:
L 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.528
K 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.505
M 0.436 0.483 0.347 0.349 0.172
Total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141
# observations 24,576 24,576 24,576 24,576 24,576
# firms 10,849 10,849 10,849 10,849 10,849
Chi2 25,699 26,845 30,426 30,479 11,850
GLS 
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The standard
errors are clustered at firm level.











Diff. p-value # obser. # firms p-valuea)
Main sample GLS 12.230 12.695 -0.466 *** 0.000 11.344 11.859 0.515 *** 0.000 24,576 10,849 0.000
System-GMM 11.681 12.878 -1.197 NS 0.150 10.645 11.922 1.277 * 0.063 0.141
Value added GLS 10.971 11.375 -0.405 *** 0.000 10.489 10.925 0.435 *** 0.000 32,024 14,507 0.000
System-GMM 13.585 11.181 2.404 NS 0.692 13.794 10.749 -3.046 NS 0.610 0.424
Narrower definition of IOF GLS 12.230 12.704 -0.474 *** 0.000 11.358 11.891 0.532 *** 0.000 22,790 9,858 0.000
System-GMM 11.136 13.263 -2.127 NS 0.107 10.499 12.000 1.501 NS 0.174 0.053
Only 2010 and 2011 GLS 12.175 12.684 -0.510 *** 0.000 11.307 11.862 0.555 *** 0.000 17,073 10,119 0.000
System-GMM 11.367 13.094 -1.727 *** 0.009 10.432 11.932 1.501 *** 0.007 0.053
Data cleaning GLS 11.988 12.393 -0.405 *** 0.000 11.040 11.536 0.497 *** 0.000 214,826 93,182 0.000
System-GMM 11.681 12.948 -1.267 NS 0.139 9.852 11.551 1.699 * 0.051 0.032
Micro firms GLS 11.042 11.465 -0.423 *** 0.000 10.674 11.115 0.441 *** 0.000 17,888 8,435 0.000
System-GMM 10.750 11.658 -0.908 ** 0.025 10.178 11.153 0.975 ** 0.044 0.112
Other firms GLS 13.595 14.121 -0.526 *** 0.000 13.394 14.005 0.610 *** 0.000 6,688 2,848 0.000
System-GMM 14.169 14.103 0.066 NS 0.918 14.118 13.948 -0.170 NS 0.802 0.084
Translog specification GLS 12.229 12.760 -0.531 *** 0.000 11.320 11.857 0.537 *** 0.000 24,576 10,849 0.000
System-GMM 11.779 12.822 -1.043 NS 0.463 10.181 11.911 1.730 NS 0.257 0.486
LMFs GLS 11.609 12.346 -0.736 *** 0.000 11.052 11.788 0.735 *** 0.000 5,918 2,768 0.000
System-GMM 12.099 12.988 -0.890 NS 0.612 11.558 11.782 0.224 NS 0.900 0.133
Sample size GLS 12.235 12.709 -0.474 *** 0.000 11.283 11.807 0.523 *** 0.000 3,522 2,389 0.000
          Representative System-GMM 12.457 12.704 -0.247 NS 0.601 11.618 11.600 -0.018 NS 0.971 0.934
          Matching GLS 12.237 12.629 -0.392 *** 0.000 12.018 12.439 0.420 *** 0.000 3,394 2,022 0.000
System-GMM 12.226 12.731 -0.505 NS 0.321 11.975 12.468 0.493 NS 0.320 0.674
Extrapolation 2010-2015 GLS 12.330 12.727 -0.397 *** 0.000 11.408 11.842 0.434 *** 0.000 43,155 13,088 0.000
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. a) P-value related to overall difference in technology between cooperatives and IOFs.
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Diff. p-value # obser. # firms p-valuea)
Agriculture and other GLS 10.484 11.303 -0.819 *** 0.000 10.291 11.161 0.870 *** 0.000 2,111 923 0.000
System-GMM 11.114 11.369 -0.255 NS 0.827 10.942 11.164 0.222 NS 0.833 0.984
Food GLS 12.186 12.447 -0.261 *** 0.005 12.562 12.924 0.363 *** 0.000 1,692 731 0.001
System-GMM 12.978 12.357 0.621 NS 0.529 13.042 12.860 -0.183 NS 0.860 0.153
Beverages GLS 13.766 13.852 -0.086 NS 0.292 12.260 12.471 0.211 * 0.067 1,960 750 0.000
System-GMM 14.554 13.843 0.711 NS 0.392 12.849 12.428 -0.420 NS 0.586 0.875
Textile, clothing and other GLS 8.900 9.783 -0.883 NS 0.173 12.135 12.254 0.119 NS 0.845 474 196 0.002
System-GMM 5.588 10.262 -4.675 NS 0.111 21.034 12.327 -8.707 NS 0.408 0.007
Other manufacturing GLS 10.526 10.840 -0.314 NS 0.458 12.196 12.607 0.411 NS 0.417 1,306 523 0.443
System-GMM 11.517 9.759 1.758 NS 0.226 12.662 12.630 -0.032 NS 0.985 0.439
Electricity, water and construction GLS 11.829 12.761 -0.932 *** 0.000 11.509 12.361 0.852 *** 0.003 1,571 858 0.000
System-GMM 12.071 12.968 -0.897 NS 0.437 12.111 12.429 0.318 NS 0.794 0.106
Wholesale trade GLS 12.717 13.111 -0.395 *** 0.000 11.382 11.660 0.278 *** 0.005 6,398 2,585 0.000
System-GMM 12.552 13.224 -0.671 NS 0.337 10.987 11.683 0.696 NS 0.247 0.013
Retail trade GLS 11.522 11.898 -0.376 *** 0.000 11.512 11.848 0.336 *** 0.000 3,865 1,557 0.000
System-GMM 11.459 11.868 -0.409 *** 0.006 11.385 11.858 0.473 ** 0.016 0.011
Storage, hotels, media and other GLS 11.583 11.798 -0.214 NS 0.153 11.776 12.251 0.476 ** 0.011 573 275 0.004
System-GMM 11.593 11.775 -0.182 NS 0.800 12.056 12.259 0.203 NS 0.795 0.297
Education GLS 12.743 13.216 -0.473 ** 0.019 10.873 11.524 0.651 *** 0.010 1,978 959 0.001
System-GMM 15.625 12.849 2.776 NS 0.192 13.968 11.347 -2.621 NS 0.239 0.004
Social work GLS 11.823 12.992 -1.169 *** 0.000 10.710 11.474 0.764 *** 0.000 850 547 0.000
System-GMM 11.416 12.868 -1.452 *** 0.005 10.312 11.554 1.243 ** 0.039 0.009
Artistic and cultural associations GLS 10.498 11.214 -0.716 *** 0.001 10.664 11.151 0.487 * 0.062 860 447 0.000
System-GMM 10.295 11.210 -0.915 NS 0.264 10.679 11.211 0.533 NS 0.584 0.304
Other associations GLS 11.214 11.096 0.118 NS 0.573 10.769 11.177 0.408 * 0.073 1,118 528 0.008
System-GMM 12.356 11.029 1.327 * 0.099 11.315 11.189 -0.126 NS 0.900 0.027
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. a) P-value related to overall difference in technology between cooperatives and IOFs.
Cooperatives IOFs Overall















Agriculture and other GLS 10.501 11.440 -0.940 *** 0.000 10.455 11.162 0.707 *** 0.000 2,111 923 0.000
System-GMM 10.629 11.508 -0.879 NS 0.105 10.596 11.177 0.581 * 0.053 0.457
Food GLS 12.181 12.512 -0.331 *** 0.000 12.565 12.927 0.362 *** 0.001 1,692 731 0.000
System-GMM 12.730 12.563 0.167 NS 0.826 12.974 12.915 -0.058 NS 0.933 0.339
Beverages GLS 13.758 13.920 -0.162 ** 0.016 12.280 12.471 0.191 * 0.083 1,960 750 0.000
System-GMM 13.986 13.853 0.133 NS 0.764 12.422 12.549 0.126 NS 0.722 1,960 750 0.182
Textile, clothing and other GLS 8.923 10.050 -1.127 *** 0.000 18.887 12.124 -6.763 * 0.080 474 196 0.000
System-GMM 7.612 10.204 -2.592 NS 0.679 29.565 12.372 -17.193 NS 0.738 0.000
Other manufacturing GLS 10.438 11.430 -0.992 n.d. 44.471 12.609 -31.863 n.d 1,306 523 0.000
System-GMM 10.526 10.840 -0.314 NS 0.458 12.196 12.607 0.411 NS 0.417 0.443
Electricity, water and construction GLS 11.845 12.755 -0.910 *** 0.000 11.708 12.358 0.651 * 0.067 1,571 858 0.000
System-GMM 11.585 13.188 -1.603 ** 0.019 12.062 12.456 0.394 NS 0.652 0.093
Wholesale trade GLS 12.712 13.179 -0.467 *** 0.000 11.304 11.660 0.356 *** 0.001 6,398 2,585 0.000
System-GMM 12.723 13.105 -0.382 NS 0.285 11.117 11.672 0.554 NS 0.295 0.289
Retail trade GLS 11.525 11.888 -0.363 *** 0.000 11.404 11.847 0.444 *** 0.000 3,865 1,557 0.000
System-GMM 11.551 11.840 -0.289 NS 0.167 11.928 11.858 -0.070 NS 0.897 0.040
Storage, hotels, media and other GLS 11.550 11.763 -0.212 NS 0.133 11.959 12.248 0.289 NS 0.352 573 275 0.000
System-GMM 10.670 11.842 -1.173 NS 0.215 8.848 12.322 3.475 * 0.081 0.286
Education GLS 12.703 13.288 -0.585 *** 0.004 11.165 11.526 0.361 NS 0.160 1,978 959 0.000
System-GMM 12.907 13.198 -0.291 NS 0.701 10.496 11.551 1.055 NS 0.175 0.126
Social work GLS 11.822 13.144 -1.322 *** 0.000 10.781 11.479 0.699 *** 0.000 850 547 0.000
System-GMM 11.516 12.540 -1.024 ** 0.014 10.252 11.585 1.333 NS 0.168 0.021
Artistic and cultural associations GLS 10.573 11.132 -0.559 *** 0.001 10.628 11.161 0.533 *** 0.000 860 447 0.000
System-GMM 9.928 11.480 -1.552 NS 0.574 8.717 11.231 2.514 * 0.062 0.000
Other associations GLS 11.163 11.170 -0.007 NS 0.971 11.490 11.193 -0.297 NS 0.215 1,118 528 0.008
System-GMM 11.214 11.096 0.118 NS 0.573 10.769 11.177 0.408 * 0.073 0.008
Cooperatives IOFs Overall
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. a) P-value related to overall difference in technology between cooperatives and IOFs. "n.d." indicates
that the variance matrix of the estimated coefficients is highly singular, thus not allowing to compute the p-value of the restriction imposed.











Diff. p-value # obser. # firms p-valuea)
Agriculture and other GLS 10.496 11.367 -0.871 *** 0.000 10.202 11.174 0.971 *** 0.000 1,031 469 0.000
System-GMM 8.292 11.531 -3.239 NS 0.124 8.412 11.346 2.935 NS 0.152 0.369
Textile, clothing and other GLS 9.629 10.427 -0.798 *** 0.000 10.253 12.291 2.038 *** 0.000 450 187 0.000
System-GMM 7.421 10.940 -3.519 NS 0.621 11.159 12.364 1.205 NS 0.950 0.052
Other manufacturing GLS 10.526 10.841 -0.315 NS 0.456 12.193 12.607 0.414 NS 0.413 1,306 523 0.442
System-GMM 10.296 10.784 -0.488 NS 0.883 11.424 12.637 1.213 NS 0.750 0.339
Electricity, water and construction GLS 10.421 11.043 -0.622 NS 0.664 11.209 11.831 0.622 * 0.091 1,323 768 0.000
System-GMM 9.503 14.989 -5.486 NS 0.280 11.064 11.972 0.908 NS 0.646 0.129
Wholesale trade GLS 13.072 13.492 -0.419 ** 0.016 11.648 11.454 -0.194 NS 0.270 6,398 2,585 0.000
System-GMM 13.127 14.452 -1.325 NS 0.623 11.825 11.614 -0.210 NS 0.944 0.683
Education GLS 11.465 12.355 -0.890 *** 0.000 10.717 11.113 0.396 * 0.071 1,167 544 0.000
System-GMM 15.300 12.502 2.798 NS 0.703 13.409 10.945 -2.464 NS 0.773 0.546
LMFs IOFs Overall
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. a) P-value related to overall difference in technology between LMFs and IOFs.











Diff. p-value # obser. # firms p-valuea)
Agriculture and other GLS 10.615 11.349 -0.735 *** 0.000 10.194 11.093 0.899 *** 0.000 3,648 1,223 0.000
System-GMM 10.887 11.370 -0.483 NS 0.670 10.433 11.134 0.701 NS 0.474 0.314
Food GLS 12.250 12.475 -0.225 ** 0.015 12.567 12.921 0.354 *** 0.001 3,236 872 0.013
System-GMM 13.490 12.265 1.226 NS 0.239 13.585 12.831 -0.754 NS 0.475 0.098
Beverages GLS 13.868 13.854 0.014 NS 0.859 12.357 12.345 -0.013 NS 0.930 4,243 969 0.067
System-GMM 15.156 13.735 1.421 * 0.066 13.230 12.249 -0.981 NS 0.143 0.436
Textile, clothing and other GLS 9.188 10.038 -0.850 NS 0.142 10.705 12.303 1.598 NS 0.346 785 222 0.335
System-GMM 10.124 9.411 0.712 NS 0.544 15.063 12.285 -2.778 NS 0.613 0.983
Other manufacturing GLS 10.424 10.673 -0.249 NS 0.567 12.356 12.735 0.379 NS 0.398 2,640 677 0.006
System-GMM 13.148 7.712 5.436 *** 0.002 16.622 12.763 -3.858 NS 0.154 0.000
Electricity, water and construction GLS 11.725 12.512 -0.787 *** 0.000 11.533 12.369 0.836 *** 0.001 2,461 985 0.000
System-GMM 11.063 12.561 -1.498 NS 0.246 10.888 12.504 1.616 NS 0.231 0.001
Wholesale trade GLS 12.758 13.095 -0.337 *** 0.000 11.343 11.641 0.298 *** 0.001 12,732 3,242 0.000
System-GMM 12.972 13.667 -0.695 NS 0.264 11.255 11.654 0.399 NS 0.564 0.262
Retail trade GLS 11.594 11.993 -0.399 *** 0.000 11.303 11.692 0.389 *** 0.000 4,599 1,647 0.000
System-GMM 11.593 12.087 -0.494 NS 0.124 11.084 11.712 0.628 NS 0.277 0.069
Storage, hotels, media and other GLS 13.526 16.724 -3.198 ** 0.018 11.933 12.198 0.265 NS 0.248 919 339 0.015
System-GMM 17.838 16.919 0.919 NS 0.836 11.381 12.253 0.872 ** 0.039 0.013
Education GLS 12.977 13.396 -0.419 ** 0.039 11.136 11.772 0.635 *** 0.004 2,470 1,021 0.000
System-GMM 12.230 13.216 -0.985 NS 0.177 11.382 11.704 0.322 NS 0.708 0.000
Social work GLS 11.879 12.896 -1.017 *** 0.000 10.911 11.504 0.593 *** 0.001 1,671 653 0.000
System-GMM 11.553 12.751 -1.198 NS 0.113 11.133 11.562 0.428 NS 0.680 0.000
Artistic and cultural associations GLS 10.266 11.062 -0.796 *** 0.001 10.267 11.107 0.840 * 0.002 1,529 597 0.011
System-GMM 10.607 11.137 -0.530 NS 0.382 10.622 11.153 0.531 NS 0.564 0.139
Other associations GLS 11.265 10.997 0.268 NS 0.169 11.000 10.988 -0.012 NS 0.950 2,222 723 0.066
System-GMM 11.673 10.827 0.846 NS 0.395 11.398 11.032 -0.366 NS 0.667 0.318
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. a) P-value related to overall difference in technology between cooperatives and IOFs.
Cooperatives IOFs Overall







Data cleaning Micro firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COOP -0.544**    -1.585*** 1.757*** -1.580*** -0.867**
(0.271)    (0.329)    (0.331) (0.262) (0.425)
Inputs - IOFs
ln L 0.829*** 0.562*** 0.564*** 0.581*** 0.491***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.018)
ln K 0.180*** 0.124*** 0.137*** 0.104*** 0.138***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
ln M - 0.327*** 0.318*** 0.321*** 0.324***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011)
Inputs - COOPs
ln L 0.908*** 0.426*** 0.413*** 0.359*** -0.080
(0.043) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.079)
ln K 0.180*** 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.019
(0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.024) (0.035)
ln M - 0.344*** 0.362*** 0.339*** 0.029
(0.026) (0.010) (0.023) (0.032)
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) 0.324*** 0.173*** 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.152***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.056) (0.017) (0.051)
Unpaid workers (%) -0.525*** -0.313*** -0.257*** -0.358*** -0.281***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.051) (0.015) (0.043)
Males (%) 0.065** 0.070** 0.054* 0.065*** 0.039
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.009) (0.030)
Other firm attributes
Training indicator 0.151*** 0.081*** 0.120*** 0.082*** 0.061**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.005) (0.026)
R&D indicator 0.108** 0.101** 0.144** 0.099*** 0.077
(0.053) (0.046) (0.057) (0.020) (0.161)
Firm birth indicator -0.491*** -0.438*** -0.488*** -0.417*** -0.435***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.010) (0.035)
Export indicator 0.165*** 0.172*** 0.181*** 0.172*** 0.204***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) (0.020)
Import indicator 0.140*** 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.071***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.017)
Market concentration (HHI) 0.091 0.156* 0.201** -0.098** 0.180*
(0.077) (0.085) (0.090) (0.045) (0.099)
Industry + region + year FE Y Y Y Y Y
P-value for differences in technology:
L 0.069 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.312
K 0.995 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.592
M - 0.524 0.098 0.420 0.372
Total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# observations 32,024 22,790 17073 214,826 17,888
# firms 14,507 9,858 10,119 93,182 8,435
Chi2 34,507 28,553 32,833 227,160 8,350
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The standard errors
are clustered at firm level.




(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
COOP -3.281*** -1.158* -1.375*** -1.512***    -1.660***
(0.618) (0.618) (0.361) (0.379)    (0.407)    
Inputs - IOFs
ln L 0.669*** 0.618*** 0.562*** 0.665*** 0.537***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.012)
ln K 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.137***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.0045
ln M 0.247*** 0.278*** 0.347*** 0.285*** 0.314***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.008)
Inputs - COOPs
ln L -0.164** 0.484*** 0.414*** 0.471*** 0.354***
(0.084) (0.081) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044)
ln K 0.247*** 0.141** 0.213*** 0.203*** 0.232***
(0.070) (0.057) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030)
ln M -0.002 0.311*** 0.352*** 0.318*** 0.354***
(0.052) (0.049) (0.027) (0.029) (0.036)
Labour composition
Full-time workers (%) 0.328*** 0.185** 0.078 0.133 0.146***
(0.107) (0.090) (0.105) (0.108) (0.037)
Unpaid workers (%) -0.815* -0.322*** -0.381*** -0.250** -0.341***
(0.450) (0.081) (0.102) (0.116) (0.036)
Males (%) 0.168*** 0.002 0.074 0.110 0.055**
(0.054) -0.058 (0.069) (0.081) (0.025)
Other firm attributes
Training indicator 0.067*** 0.06 0.170*** 0.152*** 0.075***
(0.015) -0.038 (0.041) (0.036) (0.011)
R&D indicator 0.057* 0.041 0.4581** 0.402** 0.073**
(0.030) -0.061 (0.214) (0.198) -0.031
Firm birth indicator -0.781*** -0.425*** -0.276** -0.271* -0.407***
(0.102) (0.074) (0.109) (0.142) (0.023)
Export indicator 0.060** 0.229*** 0.215*** 0.146*** 0.138***
(0.023) -0.041 (0.045) (0.045) -0.012
Import indicator 0.051*** 0.075** 0.067* 0.018 0.083***
(0.018) -0.035 (0.035) (0.037) -0.01
Market concentration (HHI) 0.165 -0.167 0.129 -0.154 -0.43
(0.164) (0.639) (0.137) (0.143) -0.057
Industry + region + year FE Y Y Y Y Y
P-value for differences in technology:
L 0.050 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000
K 0.000 0.673 0.006 0.010 0.002
M 0.962 0.507 0.827 0.278 0.247
Total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# observations 6,688 5,918 3,522 3,394 43,155
# firms 2,848 2,768 2,401 2,022 13,088
Chi2 10,886 6,421 10,400 8,919 32,192
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The standard errors
are clustered at firm level.
Sample size




Using 2010 and 
2011
Data cleaning Micro firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COOP 11.389 5.816 1.381 -3.402 0.717
(7.596)    (4.857)    (2.211) (4.364) (2.718)
Inputs - IOFs
ln L 0.487 -0.232 0.463*** 0.052 0.415***
(0.304) (0.335) (0.124) (0.079) (0.126)
ln K 0.664** 0.946*** 0.412*** 0.774*** 0.104**
(0.276) (0.301) (0.082) (0.124) (0.045)
ln M - 0.315** 0.391*** 0.391*** 0.576***
(0.146) (0.070) (0.043) (0.069)
Inputs - COOPs
ln L 0.397 0.259 0.457** 0.607** 0.346
(0.324) (0.0396) (0.186) (0.290) (0.289)
ln K -0.104 0.308 0.301** 0.799** 0.228
(0.537) (0.287) (0.150) (0.332) (0.217)
ln M - 0.217 0.245 0.454*** 0.306**
(0.284) (0.172) (0.168) (0.148)
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) 1.036 1.327 -0.289 0.365 -0.540
(1.051) (0.944) (0.590) (0.277) (0.515)
Unpaid workers (%) -0.404 0.820 0.361 0.037 0.008
(0.640) (0.941) (0.386) (0.230) (0.328)
Males (%) -0.501 1.113 -0.096 0.610 -0.944*
(3.822) -1.632 (0.771) (0.827) (0.569)
Other firm attributes
Training indicator -0.241 0.209 -0.360 -0.439*** 0.175
-0.541 (0.578) (0.238) (0.153) (0.201)
R&D indicator 0.973 -1.119 0.368 -0.771 -0.506
-1.126 (1.231) (0.274) (0.960) (0.474)
Firm birth indicator -0.136 -0.260* -0.284*** -0.193*** -0.318***
(0.197) (0.148) (0.064) (0.036) (0.070)
Export indicator 0.040 0.174 0.046 -0.036 0.256**
(0.150) (0.216) (0.082) (0.096) (0.103)
Import indicator 0.107 -0.256 -0.170** -0.494*** -0.038
(0.390) (0.240) (0.085) (0.087) (0.108)
Market concentration (HHI) 0.262 0.509* 0.443*** -0.543*** 0.483***
(0.440) -0.303 (0.167) (0.170) (0.179)
Industry + region + year FE Y Y Y Y Y
P-value for differences in technology:
L 0.784 0.281 0.978 0.060 0.825
K 0.231 0.069 0.516 0.941 0.583
M - 0.774 0.431 0.720 0.095
Total 0.424 0.053 0.053 0.032 0.112
# observations 32,024 22,790 17,073 214,826 17,888
# firms 14,507 9,858 10,119 93,182 8,435
# instruments 47 48 80 59 84
Hansen test 0.330 0.860 0.094 0.283 0.450
Chi2 4,830 3,283 10,181 33,481 2,454
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The standard errors
are clustered at firm level.
Other firms LMFs
(6) (7) (8) (9)
COOP -2.674 7.953** 1.311 0.429
(2.995) (3.836) (2.888) (2.446)
Inputs - IOFs
ln L 0.701*** 0.284 0.586* 0.184
(0.159) (0.314) (0.278) (0.334)
ln K 0.127* 0.715** 0.282* 0.281*
(0.077) (0.283) (0.149) (0.159)
ln M 0.414*** 0.367** 0.335** 0.452*
(0.097) (0.164) (0.135) (0.244)
Inputs - COOPs
ln L 0.167 0.892* 0.464** 0.552***
(0.312) (0.526) (0.203) (0.184)
ln K 0.241 -0.005 0.150 0.233**
(0.161) (0.235) (0.129) (0.106)
ln M 0.648*** 0.222 0.362*** 0.357***
(0.144) (0.341) (0.119) (0.107)
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) -0.431 1.324 -0.442 0.703
(1.163) (1.098) (0.576) (0.766)
Unpaid workers (%) 0.360 0.583 -1.103* 0.266
(1.841) (1.459) (0.580) (0.622)
Males (%) 0.911 -0.385 0.149 -0.551
(0.811) (1.459) (0.872) (0.881)
Other firm attributes
Training indicator 0.178 -0.996 0.346 0.298
(0.111) (0.987) (0.448) (0.279)
R&D indicator -0.202* 0.291 0.992 0.710
(0.113) (0.577) (0.911) (0.652)
Firm birth indicator -0.419*** -0.050 0.069 -0.149
(0.121) (0.210) (0.307) (0.273)
Export indicator 0.054 0.102 0.336 0.172
(0.099) (0.414) (0.315) (0.187)
Import indicator -0.105 -0.888* -0.200 0.077
(0.077) (0.494) (0.250) (0.170)
Market concentration (HHI) -0.253 -1.556 -0.035 -0.003
(0.297) (1.378) (0.217) (0.257)
Industry + region + year FE Y Y Y Y
P-value for differences in technology:
L 0.146 0.278 0.695 0.271
K 0.513 0.063 0.484 0.795
M 0.186 0.696 0.882 0.707
Total 0.084 0.133 0.934 0.674
# observations 6,688 5,918 3,522 3,394
# firms 2,848 2,768 2,410 2,022
# instruments 84 49 56 84
Hansen test 0.441 0.393 0.865 0.468
Chi2 5,951 1,658 2,732 3,489
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The standard errors
are clustered at firm level.
Table A2 (cont.) - Cobb-Douglas regression results (System-GMM): Robustness and extensions
Sample size
Table A3 - Translog regression results
COOP
(19.511)
Inputs IOFs COOPs IOFs COOPs
ln L 0.994*** 0.195 0.643 3.865
(0.086) (0.201) (2.986) (3.130)
ln K 0.087** 0.002 3.333*** -0.867
(0.040) (0.191) (1.046) (2.207)
ln M -0.045 0.295*** -0.412 -1.024
(0.041) (0.123) (0.772) (1.809)
ln L2 0.048*** -0.028 0.206 0.05
(0.009) (0.026) (0.301) (0.307)
ln K2 0.011*** 0.014* -0.144** 0.065
(0.002) (0.008) (0.063) (0.118)
ln M2 0.030*** 0.015*** 0.047* 0.029
(0.002) (0.005) (0.025) (0.056)
ln L* ln K -0.018** 0.054** -0.001 -0.357
(0.008) (0.022) (0.308) (0.394)
ln M*ln K -0.014*** -0.015 -0.014 0.038
(0.003) (0.010) (0.088) (0.153)
ln M*ln L -0.043*** -0.034** -0.062 0.086
(0.006) (0.017) (0.094) (0.217)
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%)





















































Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The standard errors are
clustered at firm level.
0.952
(0.715)
1.006
(0.765)
-2.182
(2.575)
0.272
(0.496)
-0.606
(0.508)
-0.457**
(0.222)
0.455**
0.013
